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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Western powers are the chief targets of a global Islamic jihad.
Once believed to be a relic of history, the notion of Islamic jihad regained a political role in
the 1980s.
There are multiple meanings of the term jihad. While “great jihad” implies peaceful
activity “small jihad” denotes the use of violence.
There has never been a war in which Christians and Muslims have participated where the
latter has not appealed to the slogan of holy war.
The failure of Iran’s “white revolution” in 1979 set the stage for development of violent
strategies against the West.
The Chechen conflict is an isolated instance of separatism rather than a part of a “world
Jihad”, as the Russian political establishment maintains.
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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JIHAD: ISLAMIC JIHAD
The Encyclopedia of Jihad: In recent years a great deal of speculation has been
focused on the term “encyclopedia of Jihad”. Westerners have often questioned whether or
not there was a specific book or set of books that should be referred to as an encyclopedia.
In truth, there is no specific book or even collection of books but rather a body of teachings
that constitute what we must regard as an encyclopedia of jihad.
In the last two decades of the twentieth century the phenomenon “jihad”, Muslim
holy war, became a reality of international political life. The appeal to Jihad has turned out
to be an almost inevitable characteristic of conflicts carried out along the Islamic-Christian
frontier. Jihad is mentioned in connection with the “clash of civilizations” discussed by
Western scholars. It is finally becoming the ideological foundation for international
terrorism, which in the 1990s (and even earlier) became a form of radical Islamic activity.
The term “jihad” found a solid place in the political vocabulary of the second half
of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty first century; it received wide
spread use in the media. The word “jihad” itself and the words derived from it - “mujahed”
and (the incorrect) “jihadist” have entered the mass consciousness of many non-Muslim
nations.
In the consciousness of a large part of the world community, including the Muslim
world, and according to those precepts that constitute our encyclopedia of jihad, the jihad
concept is associated primarily with militant Muslims fighting with the infidels and against
all those who represent a threat to Islam. Two polar opposite relations come out of this - an
especially negative one, characteristic of those whom the jihad is potentially directed
against, and a respectfully enthusiastic one, found in the participants, that is, the mujaheds
themselves, and also the Muslims that sympathize with them.
In a situation of constant tension and strained relations between several Muslim
countries and Christian European countries, in conditions of internal political conflict,
connected with the self determination of the Muslim minority, that has a place in Russia, in
the territories of the former Yugoslavia, in the Philippines, in India, etc., beyond the
boundaries of the Muslim world jihad has begun to be seen as synonymous with militant
Muslim activity.
In connection with this it is always appropriate to talk about the ambivalence of this
concept, of which the moderate Muslim politicians and clerics, who all insist on the danger
of a one sided interpretation of jihad, are constantly trying to recall.
Origins of the Concept of Jihad: The original word “jihad” is translated from
Arabic as effort. In the Islamic context this is refers efforts carried out in the name of
Islam, focused on the good of the Muslim society or Umma. In Muslim theology there are
quite a few interpretations of jihad (including the Vakhabit or wahabite, which is one of the
best known and most militant. A few types of jihad appear to be the most widespread and
generally accepted. “Great jihad”, the “spiritual jihad” (jihad an-nafsii), signifying the
constant self improvement of the Muslim, his adherence to Islamic regulations, and the
fulfillment of the Islamic behavioral norms. The great jihad can simultaneously be seen as
any constructive activity by a Muslim, bringing benefit to society and to himself. A good
illustration of such an approach can be seen in the words of the former Algerian President
Huara Bumeden (1965 - 1978) who said that “to build a house, to plant a tree, to give birth
to a child - this is jihad”. In 1979 the Ayatollah Khomeini announced a war by means of
jihad against illiteracy. In the 1960s the President of Egypt Hamal Abdel Nasser called the
construction of the high altitude Aswan Dam a jihad. This list could easily be continued
with similar quotes.
W I L L I A M

R .

N E L S O N

I N S T I T U T E



2 0 0 1

5

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

J I H A D :

I S L A M I C

J I H A D

Small jihad is distinctly militant, signifying an armed struggle against the enemies
of Islam or the spread of Islam in non Islamic territories. In small jihad there is one more
designation - gazavat, coming from the concept of ”gazva” - raid. In this case the term is
about specific actions, the raids (the plural is gazavat) carried out by Mohammed against
his adversaries - the heathens in Mecca, from which he was forced to leave in 622.
Interestingly, the prophet himself divided jihad into greater and lesser strains,
understanding the military activity of the later. Thus, the famous khadis, in which it is said
that, having returned from a military campaign, Mohammed said: “We have returned from
a small jihad in order to turn to a great jihad.”
Subsequent, more detailed interpretations of jihad have come from the Muslim
theologians. In a popular detailed interpretation, jihad is divided into four types: “Jihad
nafsii” (self improvement), “jihad shaitani” (struggle with the devil), “Jihad al-kufar”
(struggle against the infidel), and “jihad al-munafikin” (struggle against hypocrites).
Moreover, they differentiate “jihad of tongue”, “jihad of hand”, having specific, applied
content, but making up elements of great jihad. On the whole it is possible to agree with
the Islamic scholar from Kazakhstan N. S. Al’niyazova, that the differing interpretations of
jihad “are strongly intertwined, and occasionally one concept of jihad can include several
others within itself”.¹
According to Islamic tradition, the entire world was divided into three parts: Dal alislam (the territory of Islam), dar al-harb (the territory of war), and dar as-sul’kh (the
territory of agreement between Muslims and the local non-Muslim population. The
methods of small jihad are employed only to dar al-harb.
The reduction of the entire jihad complex to small jihad undoubtedly contributes to
confrontation between the adherents of different religions. This tendency is demonstrated
by radical Islamic adherents who argue that the time has come to answer the West’s
“global challenge”, to restore the trampled laws of the Umma in the world. On the other
hand, many in the Christian European world of which Russia is a part see Islam as an
aggressive, intolerant, and expansionist religion.
Here we should note the reasons according to which the small, military jihad has
acquired special topicality. The slogan “jihad” has always revealed itself in times of
exacerbated relations between the Islamic and Christian worlds. There has never been a
war in which Christians and Muslims have participated where the latter has not appealed to
the slogan of holy war. Jihad began to take on special significance in the nineteenth
century when the European states were asserting their power in Muslim lands. At this time
jihad became an ideological opposition to the Europeans. Among the more famous jihads
are imam Shamil’s resistance to Russian troops in the Caucasus in the nineteenth century
and the struggle of the Algerian sheikh Abd al-Kadir against the French occupation. In the
twentieth century the national liberation movement of Muslims was also carried out under
the slogan of Jihad. Here we find the struggle of the Turkestan basmachi against the
Bolsheviks in the 1920s, the uprising of the Libyan sheikh Omar al-Mukhtar in the 1930’s
against the Italians, and the Algerian revolution of the 50s and 60s.² We can say that jihad
has evolved into one of the typical forms of relations between Europeans and Muslims.
In the 1960s and 1970s the role of jihad in the ideology and practice of the Muslim
east was not so significant. This was a time of hope in the relatively quick modernization
of the Muslim world by means of reform, the models of which came, on the one hand,
from the west and, on the other, from the Soviet Union, which at this time was
energetically working up variants of “socialist orientation” the development of third world
countries omitting the western models. The question of resistance to the non-Islamic
expansion in the commonly accepted sense of that concept had lost its significance.
Especially since in the conditions of the bipolar world Muslim states needed the support of
one of the poles, western or Soviet.
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The formation of national ideologies, something which was a continuous process
rather than a single event, began to occur after this. The national idea prevailed over strict
Islamic reflections and, as a result, distinctive Arabic nations were created with secular
governments.
During this period, the idea began to take root among the European politicians and
experts that the concept of a Muslim holy war was finally being relegated to history.
However, this by no means meant that the concept of jihad had completely disappeared.
The situation quickly changed in the 1970’s and 1980s. Two circumstances served
as the critical moment: the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. With
all of the differences in these events, one thing united them: In both cases this is the
reaction of the traditional society being forcibly introduced to new (and often foreign)
innovations. In Iran the Islamic revolution, with its active use of the jihad slogan, was
provoked by the failure of the “white revolution” of Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, who
instituted a forced modernization into the country, caused the impoverishment of
significant portions of society connected with the traditional sector of the economy. They
tried to thrust another model of political organization on Afghanistan and (sic!) to “add” to
the mentality of the tribal Muslim society something from Marxism-Leninism. When this
was not successful, Moscow began more energetic measures, sending the army into
Afghanistan. The natural reaction of the population was holy war. Thus, though little
resembling each other externally, the events became the means for the revival of jihad.
In the Muslim world of the 1970s there was a crisis of modernization ideas, of both
liberal and socialist orientations. Popular frustration grew and many people began to
embrace the “Islamic alternative” which they considered a panacea from their worsening
material position. The Islamic oriented sections of society saw the ruling elite’s inability to
surmount economic and other difficulties and the foreign, non-Muslim models of
development thrust on them from without as the main reasons for the crisis. In the Muslim
consciousness, all of this was tied in with the departure from pure Islam, forgetting its
traditions, the principles of social justice, and the norms of societal and personal behavior.
Organizations Which Embrace the Concept of Jihad: Various radically minded
non-governmental organizations began playing an increasingly significant role in the
Muslim world, as did local radical Islamic parties and movements, who energetically
called for the foundation of a Muslim state on national and regional levels, but also on a
planetary scale. Among the more notable international Islamic organizations: The World
Wide Islamic Youth League, The World Wide High Council for the Affairs of Mosques,
The International Islamic Organization of Salvation (“al-Igasa”). This also includes
officially sanctioned activities such as the dissemination of Islamic ideology and religious
education which support various radical organizations and movements, including those that
operate in Kosovo, the Philippines, the Northern Caucasus, and Central Asia.
The most uncompromising positions are occupied by “Dzhamaat al-Fukra”
(founded in 1980, in Brooklyn), “Kharakat al-Ansar” (1993, Pakistan), “Hezbollah” (19791980, Lebanon), and finally the “famous” “al-Kaeda” (1989, Afghanistan), the founder and
leader of which is “terrorist No.1”, Usama ben Laden. The activity of these international
groups have spread throughout the globe. They have hundreds of active terrorists in the
most different regions.
Concerning these national Islamic organizations, in the Muslim world they are
counted in the hundreds and, with very rare exceptions3, they exist in the overwhelming
majority of Muslim states. We will enumerate only a few of these, whose activity was
especially noticeable in the last decade. These are: The Palestinian “Islamic Jihad”,
“Hamas” the local division of “Muslim Brothers”, the Philippines’ “Abu Saiyaf” Group,
the Algerian “Armed Islamic Group” and “Front of Islamic Salvation”, the Egyptian “alW I L L I A M
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Jihad”, “Takfir va al-khigra”, “al-Hamaat al-Islamiia”, and the Indonesian “Commando
Jihad”.4
Other than those listed above, many other, mainly secular nationalist organizations,
appeal to jihad as the cornerstone of their activity. Most of these organizations are in
Palestine - The Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, The Peoples Front for the Liberation of Palestine, The Palestinian
Liberation Front, etc. Among others, there is the Kosovo Liberation Army, operating in
Yugoslavia, whose leadership is prone to defining their struggle as jihad.
All radical Muslim groups necessarily appeal to the slogan of jihad, which includes
two directives - the struggle for the foundation of a “true Islamic state” and the struggle
against the external enemy. Moreover, the call to jihad would be used to ensure
international Islamic solidarity, something that is almost never completely realized.
Often the two directives intertwine, as in the Chechen conflict where, in the middle
of the 1990s the local separatists attempted to unite a holy war against Russia with the
challenge of establishing an Islamic state.
In a certain sense the position of the Uzbek division of “Hizb at-Tahrir”, operating
in Central Asia is paradoxical. They maintain that the chief means of achieving their goal,
the foundation of an Islamic state, is great, and not small jihad. That is, peaceful activity,
which consists of the gradual integration into the power structures and the Islamic
propaganda, which should bring about the relatively painless shift of the current secular
government and society to an Islamic direction. From this point of view the position of
Hizb at-Tahrir fully reflects the thoughts expressed by the authoritative ideologue of
Islamic fundamentalism Abu alya Maududi, a Pakistani (at that time considered a radical,
though today he would be considered a moderate).
However, one must recognize that, for the most part, among the Islamic radicals the
appeal to armed jihad is the dominant tendency that actually sanctions their terrorist
activity.
Thus, jihad has again become, de facto, a factor in the relations between the
Muslim world and the west and within the Muslim world itself. Internally, both jihads are
linked as far as the internal Muslim jihad has as its goal the overthrow of those regimes in
Muslim countries which, in the opinion of the Islamic radicals, have betrayed from the path
of true Islam. This can refer to the majority of governments in Muslim countries.
At different times the high activity of internal small jihad had and has a place in
Egypt, Sudan, Tajikistan, in Algeria, in the Fergana Valley region of Central Asia, and to a
certain degree in some parts of southern Russia (in the North Caucasus). And up to the
present in these countries and regions a significant level of social - political tension has
been supported by Islamic radicalism. The peculiarity of the situation is that there is
practically nowhere the radicals, including those that use terrorist methods, have been able
to achieve a decided success. To put it differently, jihad, both small and great, has not been
crowned with the establishment of an Islamic state. The only exception in any sense could
be the Afghan Taliban, which, in our opinion, is capable of supporting the Islamic norms
of a functional society and an ultra-purist religious morality only in conditions of constant
confrontation with their opponents. It can be assumed that the absence of any kind of threat
to their quasi Islamic regime could lead to its weakening (If, of course, the regime has not
already fallen under the blows of the US - this material was completed in the beginning of
October, 2001, when the question of exactly how the US would respond to the terrorist acts
in New York and Washington had still not been decided).
The Pragmatic Failure of Radical Islam. The inability of Islamic radicalism to
realize its ambitious plans has given many political researchers and religious scholars a
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basis for asserting its ultimate failure, as formulated by the French researcher Olivia Rieux
as “the end of political Islam”.5 We note that this was said back in the 1980s, and the
opinion of the majority of specialists has remained the same. However, the failure of “the
Islamic project” by no means signifies that the battle for its realization will be cut short,
and that long awaited stability will at last come to the Muslim world. The experience of the
last decade testifies to the contrary - the jihad against the internal Muslim enemy, the
hypocrite-apostate in a number of regions is intensifying.
It is obvious that the stereotype of dealing with the traitor, with the person who has
left the path of truth and started on the path of its distortion, is at work here. On this issue
the behavior of the Muslim does not differ much from the behavior of adherents of
different religions. Internal religious clashes are always distinguished by a certain degree
of cruelty and irreconcilability. It is sufficient to call to mind the religious strife of the
middle ages between Catholics and Protestants and the inter-Muslim conflict between
Sunnis and Shi’ites.
In the modern Islamic world, jihad is used by both opposing sides. As an example,
we can bring in the reciprocal jihad of the Taliban and the Islamic Republic of Iran, or the
inter-Muslim conflict in Dagestan, where the Vahhabits, local radicals, have declared a
jihad against traditional tarikat Islam, whose adherence have in turn declared a jihad
against the Vahhabits themselves.
The inter-Muslim jihad is a struggle for power in the government and
simultaneously for the right to control societal and individual consciousness of the Muslim.
And if, as noted above, the strategic goal of the Islamic radicals, the establishment of an
Islamic state, is practically unattainable, then they have to hold on to their tactical
successes: First they have to ensure their presence in the political arena as firm and
enjoying the relatively wide support of the opposition; second they have to participate in
the ruling coalition. The evidence of how helpful this would be can be seen in the creation
of the General Accord for the Building of Peace coalition of the government of Tajikistan
(signed in Moscow, 1997), in which the Islamists immediately received five posts.
According to the agreement reached with their adversaries the local Islamists
renounced their more extreme aims, including jihad, and announced that the establishment
of the Islamic state could not be accomplished by force and that the only way was by a
national agreement. In this plan the situation in Tajikistan can be considered an opportunity
for changing the accent of jihad and its evolution from small into large/great, directed
towards constructive activity and a deepening to the religious consciousness of the
population.
We shall note this circumstance, that in separate instances in inter-Muslim jihads,
non-Muslim countries have taken part, rendering aid to one of the sides. In particular, this
happened after the Iraqi aggression towards Kuwait, when Saudi Arabia came out in an
announced holy war against the regime of Saddam Hussein. Having moved closer to the
political establishment, the kingdom’s scholar Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz called the “Desert
Storm” operation carried out in 1991 by the United States and its allies a jihad against
Iraq.6
The Anti-colonial Jihad. In the 1990s a definite shift occurred in the ideology of
jihad. Mujahed-ideologists and practitioners increased their emphasis on the struggle with
the external enemy. This is a formal repetition of the anti colonial struggle, where the chief
enemy was not their “unstable” Muslim collaborators, but European Christian expansion.
The anti colonial jihad of this time ended with the military victory of the Muslims.
Now the threat from the west, from the point of view of radical Islamic ideologists,
carries a more large-scale character and puts pressure on Islamic civilization as a whole.
This is the U.S.’s struggle for an establishment of a world monopoly and the idea of
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globalization, calling for the creation of a Unitarian culture on the western (American)
model, eliminating or forcing to the periphery those that do not conform to the western
normative valuable orientations.
But since an overwhelming number of regimes in the countries of the Muslim
world are political satellites of the west, jihad against them cannot be a basic means for
changing the situation and consequently, its main object should become just the west,
especially the more expansionist forces - the United States and, its natural ally, Israel.
Similar ideas have been ripening among Muslim radicals for quite a long time. The testing
ground for them has always been the Near Eastern conflict, in which America has been
seen as the exact same kind of enemy as Israel itself. It is enough to remember that the
Near Eastern wars of 1967 and 1973 were considered by the Islamists to be jihads against
both Israel and the United States. Even the secular politicians of Palestine, including
Yasser Arafat, have shared their views.
Approximately two thirds of the terrorist acts carried out by Muslims in the 1970s
through the 1990s were prepared by Palestinians, calling themselves “fidais”, sacrificing
themselves, willingly going to death in the name of the righteous work.7 Supporting the
fidais are the religious authorities calling them mujaheds.
Soviet/Russian Relations with Islamic Radicals. The fact that Muslim terrorists
never once tried to carry out terrorist attacks against the USSR is interesting. This can be
explained by the fact that, first of all, the Soviet Union always took a pro Palestinian
position, and maintained friendly relations with many radical Muslim regimes including
Libya, Iraq, and Syria, and they carried out diplomacy with Iran, emphasizing their shared
position in the struggle against imperialism. Secondly, and this is no longer a secret,
Moscow aided in the training, sponsorship, and equipping of terrorist groups, especially
Palestinian ones. The USSR also demanded this of her allies in the communist bloc,
especially from the special services of the German Democratic Republic, and also from
Czechoslovakia Bulgaria, and North Korea. According to specialists, every tenth (at least)
Palestinian fighter passed through the appropriate training in the USSR.8 We note that
during the Cold War the Soviet media was well disposed to the term jihad, often adding to
it the epithet “anti imperialist”. Thus, in Moscow they related to the anti western jihad of
the Ayatollah Khomeni, who “considered the Soviet - American confrontation to be an
extended tendency of world development”9 and consciously named the US the “great
Satan” but called the USSR only the “lesser Satan”, designing to use the second against the
first in his revolutionary jihad.
After the invasion of Afghanistan Soviet politicians changed their attitude to jihad
and the opposition to Moscow was began to be called “the so called jihad of the Afghan
reaction” and terrorism by Soviet propaganda.
Consequently the anti-Soviet jihad came to be looked on sympathetically in the
West, which firmly supported the Afghan mujaheds. Just as the USSR sympathized with
the anti imperialist and anti colonial jihad, the anti Soviet jihad found understanding in
Europe and the United States. In a word, outside the Muslim world the relationship to jihad
has always had a pragmatic character. At this point no one seriously considered the clash
of civilizations. The famous article by Samuel Huntington appears only in 1993, the book
of the same name provoking heated discussions only three years later.10 And, following the
logic of this scholar, in this clash it follows that jihad should become the chief form of the
Muslims’ struggle. But even at this recent time the opposition of the Muslim and Christian
world didn’t seem to interest any journalists.
The leading policy makers of the US and the USSR tried according to their
strengths and opportunities to Muslim countries and communities to further their interests,
being active in their political movements and ideological currents. In this source they
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attempted to turn one against another and the slogan of Islamic jihad. Moreover, the plans
of American foreign policy tried to use radical Islamic currents against each other. Such as
supporting the Taliban in the hopes of using it against Iran, thus using an Afghan Sunni
jihad against an Iranian Shiite jihad, which turned against the US. This political course
turned out to be successful in a certain sense, since it maintained tense relations between
two neighboring states and created an uncomfortable situation for the Iranian Ayatollahs.
Inside the Afghan jihad itself the Taliban was opposed by the jihad of the Northern
Alliance, lead by the most famous of the mujahed of the time Ahmed Shah Massoud.
US policy maker assumed that they would be able to reach an agreement with the
different radical Islamic groups and use them to further the interests of their own policies.
In any case, the first years of Taliban rule in Kabul made it possible to hope for this,
weakening Iranian influence in Central Asia, making Russia uneasy, and creating a threat
to the former Soviet republics that bordered Afghanistan, which caused them to seek closer
relations with the United States. There is a widespread belief that in the 1990s the
Americans established contact with bin Laden.
Obviously, aspiring to the status of the single world superpower, the US has
considered it possible and promising to control any group or movement, including those
whose ideologies and strategic missions clash with or are even hostile to them. On the one
hand, the US was able to show interest in ben Laden and his comrades “just in case”, on
the other, we cannot rule out that they considered using them in the game against Moscow
in the Caspian region.11 Be that as it may, the foreign aid of the Islamic radicals that were
supporting the Chechen jihad against Russia, played a significant, if not decisive role in the
destabilization of the situation in the northern Caucasus. In the Russian media information
has been spread about a visit to Chechnya by ben Laden himself. This, however, did not
receive reliable corroboration from the separatists themselves or independent sources.
Since the beginning of the 1990s bin Laden has become a significant political and,
especially important, religious authority for Islamic radicals. In 1990 he offered aid to the
Saudi regime in repelling a possible attack from Iraq. Er-Riyad, however, preferred to
depend on a more reliable partner, the US, which irritated ben Laden, who soon left Saudi
Arabia. At the end of 1990, relying on Afghan veterans of the war against the Soviets, bin
Laden created the “World Wide Front of Jihad”, of which the leading role was played by
the military organization “al-Qaeda” (the base), whose members immediately entered into
a holy war. Today al-Qaeda, according to the majority of experts is the most organized and
active organization of Islamic radicals.
In August 1996 ben Laden issued a fatwah, in which he announced a jihad against
the United States and appealed to his confederates to pursue and kill Americans. The
enemy was specified but the symbol of the entire successful western world became an
object of jihad. In the same month bin Laden’s people bombed the US embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania, this was also interpreted by them as an act of jihad.
The activity of bin Laden, other lesser groups working with him, and the policies of
the Taliban, which to a certain extent can be interpreted as “the Islamic challenge” (adda’ba al-islyamiya), shows that the ability of the West to manipulate radical Islam is
always limited and in the final analysis that radicals will always serve their inner logic.
From this point of view, jihad can turn against the parties that today support mujaheds.
In the 1990s the small jihad more and more became synonymous with military
activity (Muslims’ terrorist acts) any where in the world, not only against the military
forces of their enemies but also against the world population.
At the same time it is instilling itself as an ideology and practice of ethnic
separatists. In the second half of the 1990s no one suffered more from this than the Russian
Federation, coming up against a holy war in Chechnya. The Chechens’ religious opposition
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to a large extent predetermined the brutality of the conflict, which in the Russian media is
often portrayed as a clash of civilizations. It is not only the Chechen separatists that are
fighting in the jihad against Russia, there are several representatives of peoples from the
northern Caucasus, who believe in the idea of setting up an Islamic state in this region.
At the same time, although the slogan of jihad furthers the consolidation of
Chechen society, the idea of creating an Islamic state in this region is opposed by the
majority of Chechens. Moreover, the question of the place of Islam in the structure of the
government has become a cause of contention among them.
The Chechen jihad has not become a cause for the entire Caucasus and has not
received massive support among the nearly 20 million Russian Muslims. A bipartite
relation to it is preserved even in the rest of the Muslim world: All Muslim countries, with
the exception of Afghanistan recognize the territorial integrity of Russia, although they
express dissatisfaction with the way that Russia is trying to preserve its integrity.
However, the Chechens have received support from radical Islamic organizations,
including those under bin Laden. Chechen fighters underwent training in Afghan camps,
were instructed in the use of weapons, demolitions by Arab instructors, who at the same
time imparted their religious knowledge.
“Islamic Pragmatism” as a Policy Option. How great a role does this foreign factor
play in the Chechen opposition? It is impossible to ignore it, but it is also dangerous to
exaggerate it. At the base of the Chechen conflict is the complex relations between
Moscow and Grozny (and by no means the intrigues of Islamic fundamentalism and
American Imperialism, as many Russian politicians have maintained). From the beginning
the Chechen separatists have planned to establish an independent secular republic, of
which their leader Dzhokhar Dudayev often spoke. The Islamic component, including the
foreign aid, appeared later.
Here the question arises of how far is the holy war of Chechnya against Russia is a
part of a world jihad. It is thought that in spite of the fact that there is collaboration with
Islamic radical organizations and that the Chechens have contacts with the Taliban,
“Hamas”, “Jihad”, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and others, the Chechen
conflict is an isolated instance of separatism, following this religious slogan. The Chechen
opposition is not so much enrolled in this “world jihad” as the Russian political
establishment, especially the special services, would like to portray them. This is
reinforced by the fact that in the Muslim world the relations to the Chechens as Muslims is
rather negative. Even the Chechens themselves frequently try to present themselves as the
“bearers of the traditional features of the yafet tribes of khurrit*” which “threaten the
danger of conversion into the structural part of certain faceless Islamic umma with the
character and outer appearance of a Semitic tribe”.12 It is worth adding that the majority of
the Chechen population in general does not feel reverence for the Muslims of the Near East
and are trying to distance themselves from them. We know that the most influential Arab
in Chechnya - the field commander Khattab - is not popular among the local fighters who
are irritated by the excessive advertisement of his devotion to Islam, his haughty attitude to
the local inhabitants, and even his external appearance (long hair, clothes, etc.). It is
unlikely that this will do anything to please the Arab supporters of the Chechens.
The Chechen jihad against the Russians is to a large extent an autonomous, perhaps
even insignificant, phenomenon of the radical Islamist activity.
The West, as before, remains the chief target of world jihad. In the Muslim world
Russia is seen as, if not an ally, then at least as having suffered from American
expansionism. Remember Khomeni’s pronouncement that Russia is only the “lesser
Satan”. This idea is especially current against with background of Russia and Iran’s steady
cooperation in the military sphere and in the sphere of nuclear energy.
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So, Islamic jihad, in spite of the widespread claims that it is aimed at all non
Muslims (in accordance with the idea of the clash of civilizations), is still directed
primarily against the West. The events of September 2001 taken with the bombings in
1996 of the American base in Dahran and the 1998 embassy bombings underline the anti
American tendencies. However, Islamic radical organizations are active in Europe - In
France, Great Britain, Germany, their presence is being noticed more and more often in the
Balkans. Islamic jihad is becoming a part of world terrorism.
In the Muslim world of today no single coordinated jihad has developed into an
organization on a trans national scale. Nevertheless, separate local and regional groups of
mujaheds are capable of effective actions, destabilizing situations on a national, regional,
and, as the terrorist attacks in the US have shown, global level. Between them there is
more or less steady contact, making them even more dangerous. Moreover, not having a
common structure, the current mujaheds have a single ideological cover, that is also a
prerequisite for their cooperation.
The specific character of jihad, its, so to speak, religious vivid aspect is the fact that
the mujahed-extremists work not only professionally, but selflessly on a higher level. Their
sincere religious fanaticism sets them apart and makes them ready for self sacrifice. The
moral and psychological temper of the mujaheds hinders their forming a feeling of
compassion for their victims. They act according to a Higher will in the name of the faith
and from this point of view any of their actions can be justified as if they are the highest
judge. Moreover, the fighters receive their fatwah from their religious instructors, which is
somewhat analogous to Catholic indulgences. Here we should remember that the religious
authorities in Chechnya have delivered a fatwah for the taking of hostages for the sake of
the ransom. By this they refer to the experience of the Prophet Mohammed who, battling
the pagans, also demanded a ransom for prisoners.
It must be acknowledged that after the United States announced that countries
supporting the terrorists who carried out the attacks on New York and Washington will
share the responsibility for them, anti Americanism grew among Muslims. Judging by the
numerous anti American demonstrations occurring in Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, Arab
countries Muslim did not experience a feeling of guilt for the crimes of their fellow
believers. A film of Palestinians celebrating the fall of the World Trade Center made its
way around the world. In the Brooklyn quarter of New York itself a few local Muslims
treated passers by to sweets at specially placed tables in the street and the news of the
events in the US was received with joy in Chechnya. In Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan a
twenty year old local inhabitant admitted that “as a Muslim woman, this made her
happy”.13 Such a reaction indirectly testifies to the fact that some Muslims recognize that
the attack was carried out by their fellow believers (something many Muslim politicians,
demanding concrete proof, have disagreed with). The general growth of the potential for
conflict has stimulated the rise of Islamic radicalism, which itself is a prerequisite for
maintaining the mood of jihad.
All of this taken together makes the struggle against the extremist-mujaheds
extremely difficult. A situation is developing where the governments of Europe and
America must fight an adversary who does not “play by the rules” and justifies his actions
by appealing to a higher power. The jihad factor places the traditional security criteria in
doubt, forcing them to seek other qualitative approaches to dealing with terrorists.
A more carefully considered approach to the role of jihad is necessary, which is
used as a tool during different conflicts, including those whose solutions do not seem to be
in the foreseeable future. The conflict in the Near East belongs to this category, possibly
Nagorny Karabakh, and certainly the seemingly endless Chechen conflict.
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It is obvious that the world community, including a large number of Muslim states,
has not yet developed a reasonable and effective answer to military jihad, which includes
terrorist acts. It is possible that the answer is not exclusively found in military action with
the participation of large numbers of land, sea, and air forces. The chief method of fighting
them will instead become specific counter terrorist operations, possible only under large
scale international cooperation.
A special place in the opposition to extremism should be occupied by Muslims
themselves, the Muslim cultural, political, and especially the spiritual elite, the theologians,
the majority of whom do advocate smaller, military jihad, considering it as a last, worst,
forced measure, applicable only in the most extreme situations. In connection with this the
extremely timely “Muslim Clergy and Terrorism” conference was held in Moscow in
October 2001. The participants all emphasized the danger of identifying extreme forms of
Islamic ideology and practices and Islam itself.
The support of those tendencies in Islamic ideology which are more open to
dialogue has an important significance. It does not absolutize the past and looks on Islam
as a part of something valuable to all mankind. In their interpretation the concept of jihad
is not an obstacle to a dialogue between civilizations. Without such a positive concept of
jihad success will be unlikely.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the fact that the economic and social difficulties
in many regions of the Muslim world serve as the soil for jihad.
In the foreseeable future it may not be possible to fully escape the outbreaks of
religious fanaticism and the accompanying aggression under the banner of holy war. The
world community should think about a mechanism for their prevention and limiting their
negative consequences.
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